The Motivations & Merits Of The Obama Administration In Crafting The Multilateral US-Iran Nuclear Deal From A Homo Bureaucraticus Analysis

From a Socratic perspective one could argue that the United States of America (USA) is not an intellectual democracy [as is the case with most nation states in this form of government]. One might critically assert that the USA is a constitutional democracy, however, and therefore the process of decision making in determining who gets what, when and how might be, as far as Kantian Ethics might assert, consequentialist — the ends justify the means. Simultaneously, consider Rational Choice Theory at the offset. Correlatively, if most international relations theories generally agree that the world is anarchical by nature; then the strategy (policy — be it public or private) employed [means or in this case American Foreign Policy (AFP)] to achieve one’s desired goals/objectives (usually maximized utility) is equally worth important to analyse. Hence, this paper aims to theoretically analyse the ‘US-Iran Nuclear Deal’, concerning its key stakeholders [who?], their motivations [gets what?], external and internal factors [when?] and scope of power/power strategies [how?]. Theoretically, one could thus argue that a Bureaucratic Politics Perspective or Groupthink Approach might be a suitable lens of AFP, in a close analysis of this multilateral approach. However, Cognitive/Emotional Perspectives are not to be ignored if we consciously reflect on Iran’s theocracy (powers/role of President vs. Supreme Leader/Ayatollah). Imperatively, or perhaps as a necessary caveat, it is wise to consciously note that the process of political decision-making is significantly contextual as History, or rather historical events, constantly affect policy decision-making i.e. relationships among nation states remain contextual (if the international system is seen as inherently anarchical), as highlighted in Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938 by Ambrose & Brinkley e.g. during World War II political decisions [AFP] were significantly ‘dictated’ by ‘military necessity’. Given all of the above, this paper aims to analyse ‘The Motivations & Merits of The Obama Administration In Crafting the US-Iran Nuclear Deal From a Homo Bureaucraticus Analysis’.

“In 2015, Iran agreed a long-term deal on its nuclear programme with a group of world powers known as the P5+1 — the US, UK, France, China, Russia and Germany” (BBC, “Iran nuclear deal: Key details”). Clearly, these were the five permanent United Nations (UN) Security Council members with Germany [economic representative of the European Union (EU)], as an additional key stakeholder, in a multilateral approach to AFP. “Before July 2015, Iran had a large stockpile of enriched uranium and almost 20,000 centrifuges, enough to create eight to 10 bombs, according to the Obama administration” (BBC, “Iran nuclear deal: Key details”). Historical political tensions between Israel (US military and intelligence ally) and Iran (US economic sanctions on Tehran are contextually abound) arguably indicate a geographical threat to Israel and US influence in the Middle East via Israel — entangled alliances. Evidently, the Obama administration may have concluded that Iran poses an imminent nuclear threat given past historical events, resulting in ongoing political friction between the USA, Israel and Iran. Specifically, “US experts” confirmed that it would take Iran a mere two to three months to build a nuclear weapon given its current nuclear research and resources and therefore this was identified as, “the so-called break-out time” (BBC, “Iran nuclear deal: Key details”).

We can therefore assert that this may be why the US-Iran Nuclear Deal was pursued — angle at which to look at its motivations and merits (success/achievements as an organizational product). Now, presidentially, from a psychological standpoint (subjectivity and rationality) Obama’s political influences of thought, in this multilateral piece of AFP, might be argued to reflect a Rawlsnian Neoliberal Perspective, given his educational background. However, as far as organizational theory is concerned, “the analogy between states and individuals is flawed” as states are composed of multiple, competing actors (fragmentation of power/authority) with different motivations [objectives and priorities] (Houghton 9).

According to Essence of Decision by Graham Allison and Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy by Morton Halperin; “practitioner observations of how governments really worked (second perspective)”, augmented by organizational theory, characterized the shift from the Homo Psychologicus tradition to Homo Bureaucraticus (Houghton 5). Under the auspices of these foundational texts in the theoretical model of Homo Bureauctraticus; it is key to make note of how foreign policy, in general, must be understood (Houghton 5). Notably, (a) foreign policy are organizational products, (b) decisions are to be treated as “outcomes that result from bureaucratic bargaining and organizational routines” and perhaps more in summation, this theoretic model “is associated with the axiom: where you stand depends on where you sit . . . i.e. one’s vantage point determines the side of the issue one sees” (Houghton 5).

Additionally, given that “there is a fragmentation of power, authority and competition, that goes on in AFP machinery” — certain consequences arise (Houghton 9). Notably, AFP is not the result of any person’s intentions, but rather organizational goals, and therefore the UN Security Council [in addition to Germany as a key stakeholder in this piece of AFP], should be seen as significantly influential in the US-Iran Nuclear Deal given its authority to issue binding resolutions (organizational products) to UN member states, in its understood general pursuit of ‘international peacekeeping’ i.e. Iran, a UN member state, is contextually perceived as a global threat to a harmonious international system. Hence, the strategically coherent option to make this a multilateral, as opposed to unilateral, approach to AFP. Additionally, having reached an agreement [imposed by the P5+1] with Iran to reduce its nuclear enrichment in exchange for the lifting of previously imposed economic sanctions by the UN, EU and perhaps more unilaterally, the USA; Iran agreed to be monitored for compliance [of any breeches of the terms] via the, “Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)” (BBC, “Iran nuclear deal: Key details”) .

Hence, Iran’s compliance became an organizational product of the IAEA (BBC, “Iran nuclear deal: Key details”). Notably, we can identify that the lifting of Iran’s economic sanctions illustrates ‘pulling and hauling’ or ‘bureaucratic bargaining’ between the UN Security Council [P5], EU [representatively, Germany], Washington D.C. and Tehran. “Iran also agreed to implement the Additional Protocol to their IAEA Safeguards Agreement, which allows inspectors to access any site anywhere in the country they deem suspicious” (BBC, “Iran nuclear deal: Key details”). What we can comprehend from this is that Tehran’s compliance was in favour of the bargaining in that previously imposed “crippling [economic] sanctions”, which Nye Jr would assert as a hard power strategy, would be exchanged with “access to more than $100bn in assets frozen overseas”, allowing Tehran, “to resume selling oil on international markets and using the global financial system for trade” — again we see ‘pulling and hauling’ (BBC, “Iran nuclear deal: Key details”).

Indeed, Houghton (9) would point out that decisions take “one or two forms”. “Sometimes they take the form of bureaucratic compromises [Tehran complied with IAEA monitoring because it was incentivized with economic sanctions being uplifted] or bargains [Tehran complied with reducing nuclear enrichment because of agreeable terms that would result in economic sanctions being uplifted by the agencies represented by the P5+1, and conversely the P5+1 agreed to the terms because it would arguably maintain their economic and political authority, or rather motivations]. Basically, their objectives and priorities would be met because, “representatives of bureaucratic units are parochial and look after their own organization’s interests (Houghton 9). Houghton (9) states that they [representatives] see them [motivations] as ‘synonymous’ to “national interests because that is the perspective that their own perch within the government offers” i.e. as outlined before, ‘where you sit is where you stand’.

Hence, whereas an “outsider” might view or conclude the outcome of the US-Iran Nuclear Deal as “rational action being taken by a head of state”; it is rather more accurate to comprehend this piece of AFP as “the outcome of bureaucratic bargaining or what Graham Allison famously described as ‘pulling and hauling’ between agencies i.e. “the decision is termed a bureaucratic resultant” (Houghton 9). Alternatively, as well as equally noteworthy: (a) AFP decision-making might be significantly influenced [driven] by “one dominant actor” e.g. Iran’s Ayatollah or perhaps more accurately, the UN Security Council [as an organization/agency], and (b) “There’s also mindless routines or standard operating procedures (SOPs)” i.e. bureaucratic protocol or a specific set of procedures that generally outline the direction of political responses to political challenges, so as to “retain some form of organizational memory” (Houghton 9).

Houghton (10) points out that Homo Bureaucraticus is concerned with retaining organizational memory because its neglect may result in an “undesirable bureaucratic amnesia. Those “familiar with faceless bureaucracy” are more aware, than others, that SOPs can produce some “pretty odd behaviours” in the face of organizational threats, or rather “imminent change” (Houghton 9). Hence, to avoid ‘bureaucratic amnesia’; by design, ‘faceless bureaucracy’ is “especially adept at defensive manoeuvres” to imminent change (Houghton 9).

Once more, Houghton (10), outlines that, “Problems arise when organizations fail to adept to genuinely new challenges; they usually change only incrementally” and that’s significantly due to the institutional design of bureaucratic organizations — SOPs are procedurally decisive and “once established they can be difficult to get rid of or reorganize. Collectively, these ‘challenges’ and ‘SOPs’ are to be considered as external and internal factors, respectively, in the process of political decision-making. Hence, determining ‘when’ a key stakeholder is to receive its compromise or bargaining in this piece of AFP, from a Homo Bureaucraticus analysis.

Retrospectively, in determining ‘how’ the power strategy/scope of power may look like in this piece of AFP; it may be worth highlighting again, perhaps more concisely, that “competition over resources and control (fragmented executive authority) can be significantly problematic (Houghton 10). Having already pointed out that ‘competing actors’ with different motivations [different objectives and priorities] exist in this theoretic model of foreign policy analysis; it is imperative to take note that the vantage point of a bureaucratic representative is predicated on the axiom: ‘where you sit is where you stand’. Therefore, seeing as according to Homo Bureaucraticus, that this piece of AFP (US-Iran Nuclear Deal), is an organizational resultant — it is coherent that in a multilateral approach to foreign policy decision-making, agencies may have overlapping/competing objectives and priorities. Consequentially, organizational outputs might be similar [across key stakeholders] but organizationally speaking, the means may differ due to, perhaps, internal factors such as SOPs.

An isolated and theoretically identifiable problem with this is that we might fall into a trap of Groupthink — Homo Sociologicus. Now, Groupthink asserts that “pressure towards conformity” (which is coherent with a multilateral as opposed to unilateral, approach) leads to an “effort to achieve unanimity and agreement overrides the desire to consider a full range of policy alternatives”, given the known existence of power dynamics amongst groups and the susceptibility to what Janis describes as “excessive camaraderie” or “high group cohesion” (Houghton 11–12). Janis points out that ‘interorganizational rivalries’ are driving force to this entrapment, which is coherent with the idea of ‘competing actors’ and the associated axiom of Homo Bureaucraticus, already discussed (Houghton 11).

Although Homo Sociologicus is a departure from the Homo Bureaucratic tradition — its brief highlight helps better comprehend the merits of the Obama Administration in the US-Iran Nuclear Deal as a multilateral approach to AFP. The underlying goal of all the key stakeholders was to limit [Iran’s power] and monitor (as well as arguably influence) Iran’s nuclear-weapons enrichment program. Thus, Homo Bureaucraticus, as well as Homo Psycholgicus but moreso Homo Sociologicus, as stated initially, may be notable theoretic models to best understand that “mysterious moment of presidential” or organizational [group of leaders/advisers in an agency] choice (Houghton 3). Therefore, outlining the motivations of AFP and its success/achievements. Although, more recently, the Trump Administration pulled out of the US-Iran Nuclear Deal, much to the disapproval of the EU and UN, last year in 2018; the terms agreed upon were in pursuit of dealing with the challenge of the “so-called breakout time” in the most effective way possible, given ongoing contextual tension between Washington D.C. and Tehran. However, the USA’s subsequent withdrawal of course and re-imposed economic sanctions on Iran; led Iran to abandon the terms that were a product of ‘pulling and hauling’ involved in drafting the US-Iran Nuclear Deal (BBC, “Iran nuclear deal: Key details”). A deal highlighted as one of the most significant achievements in the history of US foreign policy and coherently, the Obama Administration (BBC, “Iran nuclear deal: Key details”).

Conclusively, the Obama Administration pursued this piece of AFP because it would address the imminent nuclear-weapon threat that Iran may have posed on international peacekeeping, as far as the UN Security Council is concerned. Germany (EU representative) was an additional key stakeholder because in the evident ‘compromise and bargaining’ that crafted the US-Iran Nuclear Deal; German’s scope of power was of economic significance, in light of previously imposed economic sanctions by the EU, alongside the UN and particularly the USA. Competing actors (fragmented authority) and differing objectives and priorities, highlighted the plausibility of organizational rivalry and shed light on the influence of Groupthink in this multilateral piece of AFP. As far as Homo Bureaucraticus outlines it is inaccurate to view this collective decision-making from a rational actor model but rather best to understand it as an organizational resultant, as policy decision-making is not entirely rational. Additionally, agencies such as the UN Security Council as well as IAEA were representatively instrumental in realizing bureaucratic interests, and SOPs were indicatively significant in understanding why organizational memory must be retained and that changes are incremental rather than radical, significantly due to the defensive design of ‘faceless bureaucracy’. Indeed, the motivations of this piece of AFP differed but the merits were seen in Iran’s initial compliance to the terms agreed upon. The merits of the Obama Administration were therefore a strategic accomplishment of diplomacy (negotiation). However, it remains imperative to always remember that internal and external factors influenced this piece of AFP, but more significantly, highlighting the fact that foreign relations among nation states remain historically contextual, in part due to the general principle in most international theories that the international system is inherently anarchical by nature. Therefore, political decision-making remains complex and contextual in whichever theoretic model you may choose to analyse it, and in this particular case — ‘where you sit is where you stand’.

Works Cited

Ambrose, Stephen E., and Douglas Brinkley. Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938. Penguin Books, 2011.

Houghton, David Patrick. The Decision Point: Six Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy Decision Making. Oxford University Press, 2013.

“Iran Nuclear Deal: Key Details.” BBC News, BBC, 11 June 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33521655.