Elenctics: Euthyphro and The Divine Command Theory
The Divine Command Theory asserts that the causal basis of right and wrong is God’s decree of what is right and wrong i.e. God dictates morality because he is God (Muhllenweg 1). In retrospect to the Euthyphro dilemma this develops the argument which Morisson presents as to whether, “Moral Law is independent from God?”, therefore deducing the obligation of adherence to God’s virtues (because he is omnipotent) as a compromise to His sovereignty (Morrison 1). Theologians would most likely be the partisans of the former view. Craig’s viewpoint is, “that God’s moral nature is to be the ultimate standard of moral goodness” (Morrison 2). Morrison on the other hand provides an elenctic debate on whether God’s virtues are complemented by God’s existence. Morrison’s opposition not only establishes a degree of implausibility in Craig’s argument but he also lays down some restrictions that must be accepted by Craig in order to un-warrant Craig’s proposition from delving into a quandary. This paper will develop into an argument for the position that ‘God condemns X because X is wrong’ by examining God’s will in the story of Noah’s Ark. This paper will address The Divine Command Theory in correlation to the theological perspective that an act gains its moral status in accordance to whether God has commanded its execution (making it obligatory) or not (making it forbidden in contrast) (Murphy 1). In effect I will be arguing that if theologians and people like Craig are adamant that God ‘supervenes’ morality because he is God (perfect) or the ‘ultimate standard of moral evaluation’ — then God’s sovereignty is compromised, and there is no definitive relationship between the connection of right, wrong and God.
Morrison establishes that there is a Euthyphro dilemma in Craig’s viewpoint of Moral Law. Craig’s assertion is that, “God’s moral nature is the ultimate standard of moral goodness” (Morrison 1). Therefore, in consideration that God’s nature is the apex of virtuous properties’, then in effect what Craig says is that the ‘Good’[1] possessed by God is what dictates moral goodness. Morrison on the other hand argues that if God’s “ultimate moral standard” is the measure of ‘moral goodness’; one can live life without the existence of God because moral goodness is dictated by the ‘Good’ of God, making this causal claim independent from God. If the claim is independent then God’s sovereignty, as praised by theists, is compromised.
Theists would have to align themselves with the negation of my prompt, ‘X is wrong because God condemns X, if they stay true to their belief that God is perfect. Furthermore, if God is perfect then logically God is right because he is God i.e. (in reversal) X is wrong because God condemns X. However, on the latter I accept that the theists can justify the will of God and his dictation of morality based on his perfection. Unfortunately, this still does not render them free from criticism if one looks at the biblical story of Noah’s Ark (Bible Gateway 1). In a nutshell God flooded the earth and therefore brought harm to humans and other living organisms because he was dissatisfied with the impurity of the earth’s inhabitants (sinful ways of mankind). In keeping with the motion that God is perfect then theists must readily accept that ‘Impurity (sin) is wrong because God condemns it’. Now, let there be a cross examination of the results of the flooding. Physical harm was inflicted on humans, fauna and flaura. Furthermore, it is also plausible to assume that as a result of continuous flooding over a space of forty days — some of mankind was killed (Bible Gateway 1). Thus, begging the question: is murder a Godly virtue? In relation to Divine Command Theory, God’s act may be formulized as follows: Murder is right because God commands it. Clearly what is right and wrong is in conflict with each other because of God’s will.
In relation to Craig’s views, not only does God’s ‘ultimate moral standard of moral goodness’ implicate that it is unparalleled to his existence but in order to render his argument worthy of satisfactory reasoning Craig must adhere to Morrsion’s rebuttal to prove that, “God’s commands are not independent of God and do not compromise his sovereignty” (Morrison 1). Failure to provide such restrictions allow Morrsion’s claim that, “If God did not exist then no one could be morally good or bad”, to be significantly true.
This argument, that God’s sovereignty is compromised, and there is no definitive relationship between the connections of right, wrong and God, sheds light on the ambiguity of which humans may have interpreted morality. Not only does the story of Noah’s Ark articulate that God may have willingly killed multi-cellular organisms e.g. plant, humans and animals but it also outlines that without restrictions moral evaluation cannot be logically explained by mankind. If God’s virtues are responsible for the ‘ultimate evaluation of moral goodness’ then Morrison may very well be inclined to be correct in his counter-argument that God’s ‘moral qualities are independent of his existence. Therefore, Morrison does not only prove that God’s sovereignty has been compromised, but effectively His existence altogether. In keeping with the essence of the Divine Command Theory one must construe that in order for God to be perfect we must not try to decipher a linkage with wrong, right and God. Similarly, the proposition of this paper’s Euthyphro dilemma, God condemns X because X is wrong, holds greater reasoning in the substitution of X for impurity (in relation to the anecdote of Noah’s Ark). If impurity is wrong because God condemns impurity, then Craig’s argument fails in its reasoning because Morrison established its absence of restriction(s), and that of the theists is open for criticism in defining the relationship of morality and God, in retrospect of the story of Noah’s Ark.
Works Cited
Murphy, Mark, “Theological Voluntarism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/voluntarism-theological/>.
Mullenweg, Matt. “Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Argument.”. 18 Feb. 2003. Web. 6 Feb. 2015. <http://ma.tt/2003/02/divine-command-theory-and-the-euthyphro-argument/>.
Domain, Public.“Genesis 7 — King James Version.” Bible Gateway. Web. 6 Feb. 2015. <https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Genesis 7&version=KJV>.
Steffel, Charis. “Euthyphro’s Dilemma and Divine Command Ethics.” 1 Jan. 2008. Web. 6 Feb. 2015. <http://www.cedarville.edu/personal/sullivan/cedarethics/papers/2008/steffel.pdf >.
[1] The metaphysical characteristics of God which Plato identifies as piety, justice, love, honesty, etc.
— The Republic
