Democratic Peace Theory: Scholarly Article Journal Guided Review (Study Guide)
1. This article is written by Plugh to extrapolate all the proposing and opposing arguments made by various scholars, about the notion of an “empirical law” in the realm of international relations that “democracies by nature do not go to war with one another” (Pugh 2). Hence, it is an assessment of whether this theory holds true (contains vigorous merit/validity) “against the traditional intellectual hegemony of realism in American IR theory” (Pugh 2).
2. It is said that the theory is rooted in Immanuel Kant’s “writings”, specifically his “work Perpetual Peace” (Pugh 1). Kant argues and outlines that “peace is a reasonable outcome” amongst “republican forms of government”, and the reason being is that he links the constitution of a republican government as being significantly instrumental in desiring peace (as opposed to war). He argues that if consent is required through some form of citizenry participation (as opposed to a declaration of war borne from the prerogative of a state ruler), thus alternatively favouring a system of government which is representatively based i.e. “separation of powers” (Pugh 4). This is because a separation of power consequentially implicates cautious behavior where war is concerned as threats towards the constitution’s “respect for human rights and interdependent social and economic relations” are taken into serious consideration.
3. (a) liberal democratic states “employ liberal justifications for going to war” (Pugh 4)
(b) Perception: liberal states are more inclined to be peaceful to one another because they believe that they will behave “rationally and sensibly” (in contrast to non-liberal sates)
(c) Checks and balances of separation of powers in republican sates put “restraints” on executive, of liberal states, from going to war due to examination, debate and deliberation on outcomes
(d) Liberal republics are more likely to “address the issue” way before war is an option
- All of the above are factors that characterize the relationship between democracy and peace.
4. (a) Maoz and Russet: “condense these factors” by compartmentalizing them into two groups — normative and structural model. Normative model: “democracies do not fight because norms of compromise and cooperation prevent their conflict of interest from escalating into violent clashes. Structural model: “complex political mobilization [separation of powers i.e. checks and balances] processes impose institutional constraints on the leaders of two democracies confronting each other to make violent conflict unfeasible”. Moaz and Russet further assert that the structural model is more meritorious because it is supported by stronger data than its counterpart.
(b) Stephen van Evera: “War is made much more likely by states’ frequent misperception of international conditions, their own capabilities, and the intentions of other states”.
(c) James Fearson: has an opposing view which argues that “liberal states are more credible in signaling their intentions to potential rivals”. So basically they have effective means to show a fellow state the disapproval of their behavior.
(d) Doyle: would most likely agree with Moaz and Russet as his survey of historical wars from 1790 to 1983 concludes that “the near absence of war between liberal states” bears examinable significance. However, Doyle proposes that a key aspect to this perpetual peace is “the way liberal republics or democracies are defined”, of which his criteria relate to “four Kantian institutions” (Pugh 7).
5. (a) The sample of democracies of which to validate this theory are rather insufficient (data is limited)
(b) Other scholars propose that the logic/reasoning of democratic peace theory is no different from revealing “statistical analysis” of a “lack of wart between staes whose name begin with a particular letter” i.e. the argument is somewhat arbitrary and fickle
(c) Farber and Gowa argue that only democracies from the Cold war era hold significance where this theory is concerned because of the tension present during that era between democracies and the “Communist bloc” because rivalry amongst each other may display weakness in front of the threat that was the Soviet bloc
(d) James Lee is opposed to the above reasoning and his criticism towards the theory is that it cannot be a one-sided affair because non-liberal states also face a threat from their Western counterparts so this idea of the shared communist political ideology must also be unifying and applicable to communist states i.e. the idea of communist peace theory can equally be apparent
(e) Raymond Cohen argues that “democracy” is inadequate, in its emphasis for perpetual peace, but rather it is the shared historical circumstances, culture and heritage which solicit understanding and sensible behavior amongst states, and that there is no causal relationship between democracies and “peaceful behavior”.
(f) Another question mark to the theory is that hypotheses formulated having reviewed other data is basically not robust as it has been compromised for bias or manipulation, especially given the “crafting” of terms such as “democracies” and “wars” which lack a unified definition amongst scholars
6. Correlates of War (COW) project at the University of Michigan validated war given that at least 1000 deaths were produced between two states which is considerably low given the millions of deaths (in total) spread apart the world wars. And post these wars, the introduction of “proxy wars” which are more akin to conflicts (as war was significantly reduced amongst Great Powers) post -Cold War, which as a result do not meet the COW criteria. Hence, this data supports the democratic peace theory, as outlined by Cohen. Oneale and Poole also support the theory with their empirical data of dichotomous vs. continuous measures by “scoring” democratic and autocratic states according to criteria that looks at the “level of democracy in a dyad” of dichotomous and continuous relationships. Scores are determined on the democracy-autocracy continuum amongst state, and where they fair on it. “Dichotomous measure of joint democracy yields” stronger support as it combines high scoring democracies with reduced political distance.
7. Democratic peace theory is rife with statistical data and empirical evidence, there are indeed many liberal states that have not engaged in war with fellow liberal sates. However, the data is greatly focused on post-Cold War evidence as outlined by Farber and Gowa and therefore is somewhat distorted. Furthermore, as pointed out by Cohen, a lack of coherency in defining terms like “war” and “democracies” is problematic in that it skews shared views, by scholars, in support of the theory as their criteria is comparatively inconsistent.
8. (a) How much research has been conducted, concerning liberal and non-liberal state behavior, with regards to war and this theory? (Communist and democratic countries have also avoided war, especially when you look post-Cold War because economic dependency does not necessarily discriminate where political structures and ideologies are concerned)
(b) If the last dated war was the Cold War then how does the absence of war validate the notion that liberal states are less likely to wage war against one another? (One can easily argue that immense effects of the advance weaponry (e.g. nukes) is the main deterrent or basis of rational behavior across all states)
